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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This is a petition for review of a final agency order 
issued by the Utah Department of Health, Division of Health 
Care Financing (DHCF) on October 4, 2000. Record (hereinafter 
referred to as "R") at 38. The Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annot. §§ 63-46b-16 (1988) 
and 78-2a-3(2)(a)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the emergency services provided Petitioner 
Cynthia Driver (hereinafter "Driver") were covered under the 
statute creating the Utah Medical Assistance Program (UMAP), 
Utah Code Annot. § 26-18-10, and the DHCF rules which 
implement the statute? 
2. Whether DHCF exceeded its authority under the UMAP 
statute by adopting a rule which excludes coverage for self-
inflicted injuries caused by a psychiatric condition? 
3. Whether DHCF violated Article I, Section 24 of the 
Utah Constitution by denying Driver UMAP medical coverage. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The final agency order may be reversed, if Driver was 
substantially prejudiced by a determination of fact, made or 
implied by DHCF, that is not supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before the court. 
1 
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Utah Code Annot. § 63-46b-16(4)(g); King v. Industrial Comm'n, 
850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah App. 1993). Substantial evidence is 
defined as "that which a reasonable person 'might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion.'" Id. When reviewing the 
substantiality of the evidence, the reviewing court must 
consider both the evidence supporting the agency's findings 
and the evidence negating these findings. First Nat'l Bank of 
Boston v. County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 
(Utah 1990) . 
The final agency order may also be overturned, if Driver 
was substantially prejudiced by DHCF's erroneous 
interpretation or application of the law. Utah Code Annot. § 
63-46b-16(4)(d). The correction of error standard applies to 
agency decisions involving the interpretation or application 
of general law and no deference is extended to such agency 
rulings. Zissi v. Tax Comm'n., 842 P.2d 848, 852-53 & n. 2 
(Utah 1992); Savage Indus, v. Tax Comm'n., 811 P.2d 664, 669 
(Utah 1991). The proper interpretation of a statute is a 
question of law. Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201 
(Utah App 1999). A presumption of constitutionality applies 
to legislative acts and, unless a statute impinges on a 
fundamental right, the legislation's opponent has the burden 
of proving unconstitutionality. McCorvey v, Utah State Dept, 
1 
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Of Transp., 868 P.2d 41, 48 (Utah 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
1. Utah Code Annot. § 26-18-10 Utah Medical Assistance 
Program 
(1) The division shall develop a medical 
assistance program, which shall be known as the 
Utah Medical Assistance Program, for low income 
persons who are not eligible under the state plan 
for Medicaid under Title XIX of the Social 
Security Act or Medicare under Title XVIII of that 
act. 
(3) The department shall develop standards 
and administer policies relating to eligibility 
requirements, consistent with Subsection 26-18-
3(6 J1, for participation in the program, and for 
payment of medical claims for eligible persons. 
(5) The department shall determine what 
medically necessary care or services are covered 
under the program, including duration of care, and 
method of payment, which may be partial or in 
full. 
(6) The department shall not provide public 
assistance for medical, hospital, or other medical 
expenditures or medical services to otherwise 
eligible persons where the purpose of the 
assistance is for the performance of an abortion, 
unless the life of the mother would be endangered 
if an abortion were not performed. 
(7) The department may establish rules to 
1
 Subsection 26-18-3(6) permits the department to exclude 
from consideration one passenger vehicle and has no bearing on 
this appeal. 
^ 
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carry out the provisions of this section. 
Article I, Section 24, Constitution of Utah 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation. 
Utah Administrative Code R420-1-5. Service Coverage 
(1) The scope of services covered by UMAP is 
limited to treatment of conditions that meet one 
or more of the following criteria, unless 
elsewhere excluded. 
(a) an acute condition characterized by a 
rapid onset requiring prompt medical attention. 
UMAP shall consider a condition to be not acute 
once it is medically established to have been in 
existence for four months or more, regardless of 
when the client began experiencing symptoms. 
Recurring conditions are not acute. 
(b) a life-threatening condition that is not 
psychiatric; 
.... 
(2) UMAP may cover the following medical 
services: 
(a) outpatient hospital services 
(b) physician services 
..... 
(e) emergency transportation services for 
both air and ground 
.... 
(3) For all UMAP covered services, the 
principal diagnosis at discharge from the hospital 
is the reason for the care. UMAP may not consider 
the other diagnoses when determining whether the 
service is covered by UMAP. 
(a) UMAP shall pay a minimal set triage fee 
for emergency transportation, emergency room 
physicians, and emergency room facility charges 
for services that do not result in an inpatient 
admission, if the diagnosis is a UMAP covered 
medical condition, but the principal diagnosis at 
discharge is psychiatric. 
(b) The minimal set triage fee shall 
constitute payment for the entire service. A 
A 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
notation on the form MI-706 advises the provider 
that he received authorization for only the 
minimal set triage fee. 
4. Utah Administrative Code R420-1-6 Limitations and Excluded 
Services 
(1) Conditions that are not covered by UMAP 
include: 
(c) mental illness or disorder, drug 
addiction, alcohol addiction 
• • • • 
(2) Services that are not covered by UMAP 
include: 
(e) psychiatry, or any service provided to a 
client while he is in a psychiatric facility, 
wing, ward, or bed; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal of a DHCF decision denying UMAP 
coverage to Driver, for the reason that her condition which 
precipitated her need for care—attempted suicide—was caused 
by a psychiatric condition—bipolar disorder. Even though 
Driver was not seeking treatment of her mental disorder, DHCF 
determined that the cost of emergency transportation and 
emergency room physician care needed to save her life could 
not be covered under UMAP. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On April 21, 2000, Driver was denied UMAP coverage for 
medical services necessary to save her life. R-14. On May 5, 
5 
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2000, Driver requested a hearing. R-12. On July 12, 2000, a 
prehearing telephone conference was held before Hearing 
Officer Bert Jansen. R-8. A formal hearing was then 
scheduled for August 30, 2000 at which Driver appeared and 
testified. On September 7, 2000, Hearing Officer Jansen 
issued a Recommended Decision affirming DHCF's denial of UMAP 
coverage. R-43. On October 4, 2000, a copy of the DHCF final 
agency action adopting the recommended decision was mailed to 
Driver. R-45. Driver sought reconsideration of the final 
agency action (R-47), which was denied on November 14, 2000. 
R-49. On December 8, 2000, Driver filed her petition for 
review with this court. R-57. 
C. Disposition in the Agency 
DHCF denied UMAP coverage initially and after a formal 
hearing. Reconsideration of the final agency action was also 
denied. 
D. Statement of the Facts 
At the time emergency services were provided to Driver, 
she was 36 years old, married and a resident of Ogden. R-20. 
She reported being in mental health treatment at Weber Human 
Services since September 1998. R-28. Driver has been 
diagnosed with bipolar affective disorder with depressive and 
manic symptomatology. R-22. She has probable obsessive 
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compulsive disorder, panic disorder with agoraphobia and 
dysthymic disorder. R-22. She has been treated with 
amitriptyline, Prozac, Ativan, Wellbutrin, Trazadone, Librium 
and Lithobid. R-20-21. Driver reported a "very disruptive 
childhood" involving physical and mental abuse. R-21. 
Driver attempted suicide by overdosing at age 15 and 
twice at age 18. R-20. She has had approximately eight prior 
hospitalizations. R-20. On January 29, 2000, Driver 
attempted suicide by consuming 60 Lithobid and 25-30 Claritin 
tablets. R-20. Driver testified that her suicide attempt was 
caused by a build up of problems but that being denied Social 
Security disability, had "tipped the iceberg" and prompted her 
overdose. R-75-2 9. Driver was transported to McKay Dee 
hospital by ambulance and treated in the emergency room by Dr. 
Dennis Smith. R-34. Driver was also administered an 
electrocardiogram in the emergency room. T-30. At the 
emergency room, Driver was "charcoaled and lavaged" with whole 
pills suctioned up. R-20. 
Although Driver was admitted to McKay Dee Hospital, the 
claims denied by UMAP pertain only to the emergency 
procedures. The claims include a bill from Ogden Fire and 
Ambulance in the amount of $519.15 and a bill from Wasatch 
Emergency Physicians in the amount of $240.00. R-15-17. Both 
7 
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bills were denied coverage by UMAP. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The emergency services provided Draper to save her life 
should have been covered, since both the UMAP statute and the 
administrative rules adopted by DHCF contemplate coverage for 
life-threatening conditions. DHCF failed to follow its own 
rules in not obtaining the best information regarding the main 
medical problem for which coverage was sought. The main 
medical problem was an attempted suicide not psychotherapy or 
medication for a psychiatric condition. 
The Legislature delegated certain authority to DHCF under 
the UMAP statute to develop rules regarding medically 
necessary services that would be covered. DHCF defined 
"medically necessary" as essentially meaning life-threatening 
conditions. DHCF's adoption of a rule which excludes coverage 
for a life-threatening suicide attempt, simply because it has 
a psychiatric basis, exceeds its delegated authority. 
The procedure DHCF follows in determining whether a self-
inflicted injury will be covered by UMAP is inherently 
arbitrary. Coverage depends on a discharge diagnosis by a 
physician, who is uninformed as to the UMAP rules, and results 
in coverage in some self-inflicted injury cases but not in 
others. The application of the statute violates the uniform 
c 
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operation of the laws provision of the Utah Constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Services Provided Driver Should Have Been Covered 
According To The UMAP Statute and Rules 
The UMAP program was developed to provide medical care 
for low-income persons not covered by Medicaid or Medicare. 
Utah Code Annot. § 26-18-10. Driver satisfies those criteria, 
since she was not eligible for either of these programs on 
January 29, 2000. The statute creating UMAP does not define 
what coverage should be provided. Instead, it leaves to the 
Department of Health to determine what care and services are 
"medically necessary" and, therefore, covered under the 
program. Utah Code Annot. § 26-18-10(5). This directive has 
been implemented by the Department of Health and DHCF through 
Administrative Rule 420-1-2(9) which defines medically 
necessary as follows: 
'Medically necessary' means reasonably 
calculated to prevent, diagnose or cure 
conditions that endanger life, cause 
suffering and pain, cause physical deformity 
or malfunction, or threaten to cause a 
handicap, and there is no other equally 
effective course of treatment available or 
suitable for the client requesting the 
service that is more conservative or less 
costly. (Emphasis added) 
The use of the phrase "conditions that endanger life" 
demonstrates the Department's well-established commitment to 
o 
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providing services for conditions that are "life-threatening," 
a term defined as follows: 
'Life-threatening condition' means a medical 
condition which, if not immediately treated, 
poses an imminent danger to life or will 
result in permanent disability. ... 
Administrative Rule R420-l-2(7) 
Neither the statute nor the definition of "medically 
necessary" care contains any limitation based on a mental 
impairment. On their face, the statute and definitions direct 
that Driver be covered by UMAP, since she was suffering from a 
condition that endangered her life—attempted suicide. DHCF 
bases its denial of services, not on the statute and 
definition of medically necessary, but on subsequent language 
in the rules which (1) excludes coverage for life-threatening 
conditions when the principal diagnosis is "psychiatric" and 
(2) narrows the principal diagnosis to the "diagnosis at 
discharge from the hospital." Utah Administrative Rule R420-
1-5(1)(b) and (3). 
Driver's case demonstrates the absurd result the rules 
produce. Driver was admitted to the emergency room at McKay 
with a diagnosis of "attempted suicide" by overdose. The 
services provided were not to treat a mental condition, which 
might typically involve the use of psychotropic medications 
m 
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and psychotherapy. Rather, the services were for the sole 
purpose of treating a life-threatening condition. Had Driver 
been released from the emergency room, without being admitted 
to the inpatient unit, the emergency services arguably would 
have been covered. However, because she was admitted to the 
inpatient unit, and because a doctor after a brief evaluation 
entered a diagnosis of bipolar disorder, her principal 
diagnosis shifted from a covered life-threatening condition to 
an uncovered psychiatric condition. 
To reach this absurd result, DHCF had to ignore the 
definition of "Principal diagnosis at discharge." Had this 
rule been followed, coverage would have resulted. The rule 
provides: 
'Principal diagnosis at discharge' means the 
main medical problem, based on the best 
information available for review by UMAP. 
Utah Administrative Code R420-1-2(10). DHCF did not carry out 
its responsibility of obtaining the best information available 
regarding the main medical problem that precipitated Driver's 
need for care. Driver was not taken to the McKay Dee ER to 
obtain therapy and medication for her bipolar disorder. Her 
stomach was not pumped as a means of treating her mental 
impairment. She was not even placed in the inpatient unit as 
a means of treating her "psychiatric" condition. She was 
11 
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placed there to stabilize a life-threatening condition— 
attempted suicide. Any treatment for her psychiatric 
condition was purely incidental. 
The representative who testified for DHCF at Driver's 
hearing acknowledged that DHCF does nothing in cases of this 
type to obtain the best information available regarding the 
main medical problem. Mr. Evans testified that a patient 
admitted for slashing her wrists might receive coverage, if 
the ER physician dictated that wrist laceration was the 
primary diagnosis. R-75-9-10. Mr. Evans admitted that a 
mental condition would probably be the cause of a self-
inflicted wrist laceration. But as the following excerpt from 
the hearing transcript shows, DHCF does not try to determine 
the main medical problem: 
Q: But in your experience, in most cases of 
attempted suicide, isn't it because of 
depression or a mental condition? 
A: I would say probably some of it would be 
depression, yeah. 
Q: —what other precipitating condition 
might there be for someone to try and take 
their life, in whatever fashion? 
A: I don't know. 
Q: You don't know? 
A: No. 
Q: So, the principal diagnosis really depends 
upon what the physician decides to put down, 
is that correct? 
A: Exactly, yes. 
Q: And do you ever go in and make further 
1? 
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inquiry about that? 
A: No. 
Q: Should the UMAP case manager do that? 
A: No. No, our policy's specific, it says we 
go by the discharge—the primary discharge 
diagnosis. 
Q: In this case, isn't it possible that had 
further inquiry been made, the principal 
•diagnosis might have been attempted suicide 
through overdose? 
A: Well, I guess the point I need to make 
here is we are not in a position to question 
the physician's diagnosis. ... I'm not a 
medical person and neither are any of my 
staff— ... and we do not have the option to 
go back to the doctor and say, should you 
have diagnosed this as something else? 
That's not an option for us. 
R-75-9-12. 
The DHCF representative was wrong under the rules in 
concluding that he could not go back to the doctor and clarify 
the diagnosis. Indeed, the rules direct UMAP officials to 
obtain the best information available on the main medical 
problem. DHCF was not justified in blindly accepting the 
diagnosis made by the ER physician that Driver suffers from 
bipolar disorder. She does have that condition. But it was 
not the main medical problem for which she was treated in the 
McKay Dee ER. Had DHCF made further inquiry, and explained to 
the ER physician the purpose for its inquiry, it seems highly 
likely the physician would have said that the main medical 
problem for which services were provided was an attempted 
1 * 
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suicide. The fact that it was caused by an overdose and not 
by a sharp instrument is irrelevant. 
B. By Excluding Coverage For Emergency Services Involving A 
Psychiatric Condition DHCF Exceeded Its Authority To 
Implement The UMAP Statute 
When a statute delegates authority to an administrative 
agency without expressly defining the extent of that 
authority, it may be implied from the general policy and 
purpose underlying the statute. State Dept. Qf Labor v. Univ. 
Of Alaska, 664 P.2d 575, 579 (Alaska 1983). As discussed 
above, the Legislature's declared purpose in creating UMAP was 
to provide limited coverage to persons who did not qualify for 
Medicaid or Medicare. DHCF implemented that purpose by 
defining medically necessary as essentially referring to acute 
and life-threatening conditions. However, DHCF exceeded its 
authority by, in effect, legislating that emergency room 
services for an attempted suicide would not be considered 
medically necessary, because the suicide was caused by a 
psychiatric condition. 
The one court which has considered whether a medical 
indigent program must cover self-inflicted injuries is St, 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. Twin Falls County, 732 
P.2d 278 (Idaho 1987). In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court 
considered the case of a man who applied for, and was denied, 
1A 
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medical indigency assistance from the county after an 
unsuccessful suicide attempt. The Idaho Court affirmed a 
district court decision reversing the county, and adopted the 
holding that 'there is no express or implied exception to the 
medical indigency law for self-inflicted injuries.' Id., at 
279. The Idaho medical indigency statute defined "medically 
indigent" as meaning "any person who is in need of 
hospitalization and who ... does not have income and other 
resources available to him from whatever source which shall be 
sufficient to enable the person to pay for necessary medical 
services." Id., at 279. The Court held that the statute 
plainly included "any person in need of hospitalization" and 
made no exclusion of persons whose need arose from a self-
inflicted injury. Id., at 280. 
The Idaho Court in St, Alphonsus held that the statute 
unambiguously included indigents suffering from a self-
inflicted injury. It observed that when a statute is not 
ambiguous, it is the duty of the court to follow it. St, 
Alphonsus v. Twin Falls County, 732 P.2d at 280. The Utah 
statute in this case is equally clear that indigent persons 
not eligible for Medicaid or Medicare and in need of medically 
necessary care are to be covered by UMAP. Even though DHCF is 
given some authority to interpret the statute, it cannot do so 
15 
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in a way that produces an unreasonable result. Nelson v. 
Betit, 937 P.2d 1298, 1307 (Utah App. 1997). By interpreting 
the UMAP statute to exclude a life-threatening suicide 
attempt, simply because the claimant is later diagnosed with a 
mental impairment, produces an unreasonable result which 
should not be allowed by the court. 
C. The UMAP Statute As Applied In This Case Is 
Unconstitutional 
The Utah Constitution in Article I, Section 24 provides 
that all laws of a general nature must be uniformly applied. 
The UMAP statute establishes a medical assistance program for 
low income Utah citizens who do not qualify for Medicaid or 
Medicare. DHCF, however, has applied that statute in a way 
that is not uniform. The rules promulgated by DCHF at issue 
in this appeal result in an otherwise eligible person being 
denied coverage, simply because of the arbitrary designation 
of the person's diagnosis when released from a hospital. 
There is a general reluctance on the part of the 
judiciary to declare a statute facially unconstitutional. 
Ellis v. Social Services Dept., 616 P.2d 1250, 1255 (Utah 
1980). However, a statute which is facially constitutional 
may be shown to be unconstitutional as applied. Id., at 1256. 
That is the case in this appeal. Driver does not question the 
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constitutionality of the UMAP statute itself; she challenges 
its enforceability as applied by DHCF in her case. 
Although the notion is compelling, the right to adequate 
health care has not been held to be a fundamental right. 
Therefore, strict scrutiny does not apply to the deprivation 
of medical assistance Driver suffered. Utah Public Employees 
Ass'n. V, State, 610 P.2d 1272, 1273 (Utah 1980). Whether the 
statute as applied is unconstitutional must, therefore, be 
measured by the rational basis test. Under that test, Driver 
has the burden of showing that the application of the statute 
is without any reasonable basis and is, therefore, arbitrary. 
Xd., at 1274. 
A review of the record in this case shows the UMAP rules 
which resulted in a denial of Driver's medical coverage are an 
arbitrary application of the statute. In adopting the UMAP 
statute, the Utah legislature intended that persons like 
Driver who are ineligible for Medicaid or Medicare would 
receive medical coverage, albeit limited. DHCF has been given 
by statute the authority to determine what medically necessary 
care or services are to be covered and has established a 
general rule that UMAP is available to cover acute and life-
threatening conditions. Had Driver needed emergency 
transportation and care as the result of an automobile 
17 
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accident, there is no question she would have received 
coverage. To deny coverage for an equally acute and life-
threatening condition—attempted suicide—simply because the 
claimant is later diagnosed as suffering from a mental 
impairment is patently arbitrary. The imminent threat to life 
was just as real in Driver's case as it would have been had 
she suffered critical injury in a car accident. 
This arbitrariness is further exacerbated by the fact 
that coverage turns on the primary diagnosis entered by a 
physician on a discharge summary. In this case there is no 
dispute that Driver's admitting diagnosis at the emergency 
room was attempted suicide. Based on that diagnosis, Driver 
received emergency room services, including the use of 
charcoal and a stomach pumping. Had Driver been discharged 
after the emergency procedures removed the threat to her life, 
the costs incurred would have been covered. Instead, the 
emergency room physician, in an apparent effort to stabilize 
her condition, admitted her as an inpatient. 
During the course of her inpatient stay, Driver was 
examined by Dr. Dennis H. Smith who prepared a psychiatric 
assessment and a discharge report which included the discharge 
diagnosis: bipolar affective disorder NOS. R-18. However, 
had Dr. Smith known of the UMAP rules, had UMAP properly 
1S 
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advised him, or had Driver known of the limitation on 
coverage, the discharge report might have included the 
primary, admitting diagnosis of attempted suicide. In his 
hearing testimony, Cleve Evans, the representative for DHCF, 
admitted the arbitrariness of this system. When asked whether 
he had seen similar cases covered by UMAP, Mr. Evans answered, 
"If the principal diagnosis had nothing to do with a psych 
condition, I have seen them cover it, yes." R-75-9. Mr. 
Evans testified that a patient admitted to the ER for a self-
inflicted injury through wrist slashing, would likely receive 
coverage, if the physician listed "wrist laceration" as the 
principal and primary diagnosis. R-75-9. Even though a 
psychiatric condition is arguably the impetus for the suicide 
attempt, either by overdose or by wrist slashing, UMAP 
coverage depends on the diagnosis entered by the attending 
physician. 
DHCF personnel make no effort to clarify whether the 
discharge diagnosis is accurate. Mr. Evans testified that the 
accepted diagnosis is whatever the physician decides to put 
down. DHCF does not attempt to determine the actual main 
medical problem. R-75-11. In responding to questions about 
the coverage for emergency heart attack cases, the DHCF 
representative's testimony revealed even further evidence of a 
10 
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lack of uniformity in applying the UMAP statute. Coverage for 
emergency care can turn on whether the patient is admitted to 
the hospital. Thus, an ER patient with signs of a heart 
attack, but with a primary diagnosis of major depression who 
was not admitted to the hospital, would probably receive 
coverage under what is called a "triage fee." 2 R-75-16. 
Moreover, Mr. Evans, who has applied the UMAP policies for ten 
years (R-75-8) understood the policy as allowing coverage in 
the case of a patient with chest pain and heart attack 
symptoms which turned out to be caused by a panic disorder, 
even though the primary diagnosis was for a psychiatric 
condition. R-75-17. Mr. Evans also agreed that the heart 
attack/panic disorder case, for which coverage would be 
allowed, was logically the same as Driver's case, where 
coverage was not allowed . R-75-19. However, the Director of 
DHCF, Michael Deily, in denying reconsideration, denied that 
UMAP services would be allowed in the hypothetical heart 
attack/panic disorder case. R-50. 
What, then, is a possible rational basis for the DHCF 
policy which, as Driver contends, results in a nonuniform 
2A triage fee was not paid in Driver's case, apparently 
because she was admitted to the hospital, although no bill for 
inpatient services was included in the record. Had the triage 
fee been allowed in Driver's case, the ambulance and emergency 
room doctor bill would have been covered, at least partially. 
on 
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application of the UMAP statute? It cannot be maintained that 
the policy has a rational basis as a cost-saving measure, 
because the Director of DHCF has specifically denied that the 
limitation on coverage has anything to do with budget 
constraints. R-50. In his denial of reconsideration, the 
DHCF director stated, 
Finally, Petitioner commented on recent 
funding cuts to UMAP and seems to imply that 
budgetary constraints may have played a roll 
[sic] in the decision to deny Petitioner 
coverage for her hospital treatment. ... As 
determined in the final order, UMAP denied 
coverage based on the hospital records 
indicating a principal psychiatric condition. 
UMAP has always been a program that is very 
limited in its scope of coverage. 
Speculating and implying that UMAP 
inappropriately denied Petitioner coverage 
based on budgetary concerns does not warrant 
reconsideration of this matter. 
If budgetary constraints are not the rational basis for 
denying uniform application of the law, then perhaps the basis is 
a rejection of self-inflicted injury cases. However, as the 
sister-state decision in St. Alphonsus v. Twin Falls County, 732 
P.2d 278 (Idaho 1987) has shown, coverage for persons who suffer 
self-inflicted injuries is an appropriate use of state medical 
indigent funds. 
The UMAP statute itself supports by analogy the argument 
01 
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that Driver's care should have been covered. The UMAP statute 
provides that no public assistance can be provided for the 
performance of an abortion, "unless the life of the mother would 
be endangered if an abortion were not performed." Utah Code 
Annot. § 26-18-10(6). Implicit in this language is the 
recognition that even prohibited services may be covered when the 
life of the patient is threatened. It is a reasonable extension 
of that rule to say that Driver's life-threatening condition 
should be covered, even though UMAP might not otherwise cover the 
cost of services for treating a mental impairment. 
In sum, there is no rational basis for excluding Driver from 
coverage under the UMAP statute. DHCF's application of the law 
should be found to be arbitrary and in violation of the Utah 
Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
Driver is one of the indigent persons intended by the 
Legislature to receive coverage under UMAP. Denying coverage for 
her life-threatening suicide attempt was unreasonable and 
unsupported by the evidence. The court should reverse the final 
agency decision and find her eligible. 
DATED this of April, 2001. 
lichael E. Bulson 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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Michael J . Dei ly 
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Fax: (801 > 538-6099 
CYNTHIA DRIVER 
Petitioner 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING, 
Respondent. 
FINAL AGENCY ORDER 
Case No. 00-172-42 
IF YOU ARE NOT SATISFIED WITH THIS DECISION, YOU MAY REQUEST A 
RECONSIDERATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS AFTER THIS DECISION IS SIGNED. IF YOU WOULD 
LIKE TO APPEAL THIS DECISION, YOU MAY FILE A PETITION IN THE UTAH 
COURT OF APPEALS WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS AFTER THIS DECISION IS 
SIGNED. IF YOU DECIDE TO APPEAL, YOU ARE NOT REQUIRED TO ASK FOR A 
RECONSIDERATION FIRST, BUT YOU MAY DO SO IF YOU WISH. IF YOU HAVE 
QUESTIONS, CALL (801) 538-6576. 
The enclosed Recommended Decision has been reviewed pursuant to Section 63-46b-12 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, entitled "Agency Review - Procedure," and Department 
of Health Administrative Rule R410-14, entitled "Division of Health Care Financing 
Administrative Hearing Procedures for Medicaid/UMAP Applicants, Recipients, and 
Providers." 
I hereby adopt Recommended Decision No. 00-172-42 in its entirety. 
RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Within twenty (20) days after the date that this Final Agency Order is issued, you may file a 
written request for reconsideration with the Director of the Division of Health Care 
Financing. Any request for reconsideration must state the specific grounds upon which 
relief is requested. The filing of such a request is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial 
review. 
Judicial review may be secured by filing a petition in the Utah Court of Appeals within thirty 
(30) days of the issuance of this Final Agency Action or, if a request for reconsideration is 
9 C? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
filed and denied, within thirty (30) days of the denial for reconsideration. The petition shall 
be served upon the Director of Health Care Financing and shall state the specific grounds 
upon which review is sought. Failure to file such a petition within the 30-day time limit may 
constitute a waiver of any right to appeal the Final Agency Order. 
A copy of this Final Agency Order shall be sent to Petitioner or representative at the last 
known address by certified mail, return receipt requested. 
DATED this day of October 2000 
/~\A: if / !i ! 
BY: ' j i i^MM/ri 
^ /I /! 
I 7 
Michael Deily, Direc^oij/ 
Division of Health Oare F ind ing 
UTAH DEPARTMNT OF HEALTH 
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BEFORE THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
( 
CYNTHIA DRIVER, 
Petitioner, ( RECOMMENDED DECISION 
vs. Case No.00-172-42 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH ( Lambertus Jansen 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING, Hearing Officer 
Respondent. ( 
Pursuant to Rule R410-14 of the Utah Administrative Code (Utah Health Department) 
and the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Section 63-46b-l, et seq., Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, a formal administrative hearing for the above captioned case was held on the 
30th day of August, 2000, at the Cannon Health Building, 288 North 1460 West, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. The Petitioner, Cynthia Driver, appeared and was represented by Michael Bulson, 
Attorney at Law, with Utah Legal Services. The Respondent was represented by Cleve Evans, 
Program Manager for the Utah Medical Assistance Program (UMAP). 
ISSUE 
DID THE MEDICAL AGENCY (UMAP) CORRECTLY DENY PAYMENT FOR 
SERVICES RECEIVED AT McKAY-DEE HOSPITAL BECAUSE (a) PETITIONER'S, 
CONDITION FOR WHICH SHE RECEIVED TREATMENT WAS PSYCHIATRIC IN 
NATURE, AND/OR (b) THE CONDITION WAS NOT ACUTE, LIFE THREATENING 
OR A COMMUNICABLE DISEASE. 
The Petitioner, Cynthia Driver, is a 37 year old female who was admitted to McKay-Dee 
Hospital on January 29,2000, as the result of a suicide attempt. On that date she states that she 
ingested 90 tablets of Lithium, 300 milligrams; 15 allergy tablets and an unspecified amount of 
alcohol. She claims this attempt was prompted by her receiving notice that her claim for social 
security disability benefits had been denied. She claims that she had prior suicide attempts, the 
earliest at age 17. She has been treated for mental illness off and on since September, 1998. She 
was discharged on January 31, 2000. 
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While at the hospital she was observed, medicated and given an EKG. The principal 
diagnosis was " Bipolar Affective Disorder NOS. Currently appears mixed with depression and 
maniac (sic) symptomatology. Probable obsessive compulsive disorder. Panic disorder with 
agoraphobia. Dysthymic disorder." She further complained of low back pain and stress. 
On April 21, 2000, a Notice of Denial was sent to the Petitioner. The Notice of Denial 
specified as reasons for denial (a) UMAP does not cover psychiatric conditions or treatment, (b) 
Not within scope of service - UMAP coverage is limited to conditions that are acute, life 
threatening or infectious and (c) Law enforcement involvement. UMAP will not authorize 
payment for any medical or surgical need which was provided to a person who was in the 
custody of a law enforcement officer, a jail or correctional facility at the time the service was 
rendered. At the pre-hearing reason (c) was determined not to be valid and was withdrawn by 
the Department of Health UMAP Program Manager. A timely Request for Hearing was filed, 
dated May 5, 2000, and received by the Utah Department of Health. A pre-hearing was held July 
12, 2000, and a formal hearing was requested at that time. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner is a 37 year old female who has suffered with psychological problems and 
suicide ideology since she was 17. 
2. Petitioner had been denied social security disability benefits and this prompted the 
January 29, 2000, suicide attempt. 
3. Petitioner had been approved for UMAP coverage effective October 1, 1998, and said 
coverage was effective on the date she sought treatment at McKay-Dee Hospital. 
4. That on April 29,2000, she was admitted to McKay-Dee Hospital as the result of a 
suicide attempt in which she overdosed on 90 Lithium tablets, 15 allergy tablets and an 
unspecified amount of alcohol. 
5. The principal diagnosis determined by her treating physician was bipolar affective 
disorder, a psychiatric condition. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The medical agency properly denied payment for services because the requested 
services were for a psychiatric condition and were, therefore, a non-covered service as 
determined by Utah Administrative Code Rule R420-1-5 (1) (b) and Rule R420-1-6 (1) (c). 
2. The medical agency properly denied payment for services because the UMAP 
program specifically excludes services for mental illness or disorder as specified in Utah 
Administrative Rule R420-1 -6 (1) (c). 
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REASONS FOR HEARING OFFICER'S DECISION 
The undisputed facts are that the Petitioner sought medical assistance from the McKay-
Dee Hospital on January 29,2000, as the result of a suicide attempt. The principal diagnosis 
specified in the discharge summary is bipolar affective disorder, a psychiatric condition. Utah 
Administrative Code Rule R420-1-5 (3) states as follows: 
(3) For all UMAP covered services, the principal diagnosis at discharge from the hospital 
is the reason for care. UMAP may not consider the other diagnoses when determining 
whether the service is covered by UMAP. (Emphasis added.) 
Utah Administrative Code Rule R420-1 -5 outlines the scope of services covered by 
UMAP. It states in part as follows: 
(1) The scope of services covered by UMAP is limited to treatment of conditions that 
meet one or more of the following criteria, unless elsewhere excluded: 
(a) an acute condition characterized by a rapid onset requiring prompt medical 
attention. UMAP shall consider a condition to be not acute once it is medically 
established to have been in existence for four months or more, regardless of when 
the client began experiencing symptoms. Recurring conditions are not acute; 
(b) a life-threatening condition that is not psychiatric: (Emphasis added.) 
(c) a communicable disease that poses a health risk to the general public 
While it is the position of the Petitioner that she comes within the coverage of the UMAP 
program because her condition was life threatening at the time she entered the hospital, it is clear 
from the provisions of R420-1-5 (1) (b) that even if the condition was life threatening it was a 
psychiatric condition that is specifically excluded. 
Utah Administrative Code Rule R420-1-6 deals with those services that are specifically 
excluded under the UMAP program. It reads in part as follows: 
(1) Conditions that are not covered by UMAP include: 
(c) mental illness or disorder, drug addiction, alcohol addiction (Emphasis 
added.) 
(2) Services that are not covered by UMAP include: 
(e) psychiatry, or any service provided while (s)he is in a psychiatric facility, 
wing, ward or bed 
Clearly, from the above language, the treatment of any metal illness or disorder or and 
service provided while being treated for such an illness is not covered under the UMAP program 
and Petitioner is not entitled to have these expenses paid by UMAP. 
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Counsel for the Petitioner argues that even if the hospital stay itself were not covered, 
UMAP should pay the minimal set triage fee for emergency transportation, emergency room 
physicians and emergency room facility charges as provided in R420-1-5 (3) (a). Sadly, Counsel 
has misread the Rule. In order for the UMAP program to cover such charges the following 
criteria must be met: 
1. Those charges must be for services that do not result in an inpatient admission, and, 
2. The admission diagnosis must be for a UMAP covered medical condition, but the 
principal diagnosis at discharge is psychiatric. (Emphasis added.) 
In the Petitioner's case, the services did result in an inpatient admission, and no evidence 
was adduced at the hearing to indicate that the admission diagnosis was for any UMAP covered 
service. Thus Counsel's argument must fail. 
RECOMMENDED AGENCY ACTION 
UMAP's decision to deny payment for services rendered by McKay-Dee Hospital in the 
above matter is AFFIRMED. No further agency action is necessary. 
RIGHT TO REVIEW 
This Recommended Decision will be automatically reviewed by the Department of 
Health, Division of Health Care Financing, prior to its release. Both the Recommended Decision 
and a Final Agency Action, which represents the results of that review, will be released 
simultaneously by the Department of Health, Division of Health Care Financing. 
Dated this 7 day of September, 2000. 
^AM^ERTUS JA 
/HEARING OFFIC 
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Case #00-172-42 
EXHIBITS 
The following documents were admitted into evidence: 
Petitioner's Exhibit "1", Statement from Dr. David R. King, M.D. 
Respondent's Exhibit "A", Rules 420-1-5 and 6. 
Respondent's Exhibit "B", Discharge summary for Petitioner's visit to McKay Dee Hospital on 
January 29,2000. 
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No: 00-172-42 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 7 day of October 2000,1 mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing FINAL AGENCY ORDER AND RECOMMENDED DECISION, to the 
following parties: 
POSTAGE PREPAID 
MICHAEL CHRISTIANSEN 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
893 24TH STREET, SUITE 300 
OGDEN,UTAH 84401 
CYNTHIA DRIVER 
2530 GRAMERCY #2 
OGDEN,UTAH 84401 
INTER-DEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
DAVID MCKNIGHT, LEGAL COUNSEL 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
CLEVE EVANS, PROGRAM MANAGER 
HEALTH CLINICS OF UTAH/UMAP 
150 E CENTER ST, SUITE 1100 
PROVO,UTAH 84606 
CECELIA RICHENS 
HEALTH CLINICS OF UTAH/UMAP 
230E2121S 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84115 
MICHAEL DEILY, DIRECTOR 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
CHRIS SMITH 
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UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. h 
I /\A 893 24th Street, Ogden, Utah 84401 
* Phone/Fax (801) 394-9431 
1 Toll Free 1 -800-662-2538 
October 19, 2000 
\' 
<> ?vc-
Michael Deilly \cm <*> 
Director *\< 
Division of Health Care Financing 
Utah Department of Health 
P.O. Box 143101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-3101 
Re: Cynthia Driver v. Utah DOH, DHCF; Case No. 00-172-42 
Dear Mr. Deilly: 
This is to request review of the undated final agency order in 
this case, which was mailed from your office on October 4, 2000. 
For the following reasons, the decision should be reconsidered and 
a decision made that the services are covered by UMAP. 
While the principal diagnosis determined by the emergency room 
physician was bipolar affective disorder, that is not the condition 
for which services were provided. Ms. Driver was taken to McKay 
Dee Hospital because of an attempted suicide. At the emergency 
room, the treatment provided was not for bipolar disorder but for 
a life-threatening condition—attempted suicide. This is 
significantly different from the hypothetical case of a UMAP 
patient who goes to a psychiatrist and is treated for bipolar 
disorder with medication and psychotherapy. To treat the cases the 
same is illogical and inappropriate. 
Further, Ms. Driver is being discriminated against, simply 
because of the nature of her condition. Mr. Cleve Evans, who 
testified at the hearing, admitted that a claimant admitted to an 
emergency room with apparent cardiac symptoms would be covered, 
even though the svmptoms might have been caused by a panic 
disorder, a type of mental impairment. There is no rational basis 
alt Lake City Provo Price Cedar City Monticello 
7. 4th 5., 2nd Fir. 455 N. University #100 23 S. Carbon #11 216 South 200 West 148 S. Main #1 
328-8891 374-6766 637-2295 586-2571 587-3266 
800-662-4245 1-800-662-1563 1-800-662-1772 
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Page 2 
for distinguishing such a case from what happened in Ms. Driver's 
case. Refusal to cover Ms. Driver represents a denial of equal 
protection under both the Utah and United States constitutions. 
Ms. Driver. 
I recognize that limited funds in the UMAP budget have forced 
severe restriction of services. However, even within those 
limitations, people must be treated fairly. It is wrong to exalt 
form over substance by classifying Ms. Driver's case as one 
involving a psychiatric condition and, therefore, ineligible. The 
Constitution was adopted to prevent such unfairness and I encourage 
you to reconsider this unfortunate decision. 
Very truly yours, 
fichael E. Bulson 
Attorney at Law 
alt Lake City Provo Price Cedar City Monticello 
'. 4th S.y 2nd Fir. 455 N. University #100 23 S. Carbon #11 216 South 200 West 148 S. Main #1 
328-8891 374-6766 637-2295 586-2571 587-3266 
800-662-4245 1-800-662-1563 1-800-662-1772 
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CYNTHIA DRIVER, ; 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH ] 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING, ; 
Respondent. ] 
) DENIAL OF REQUEST 
) FOR RECONSIDERATION 
) Case No. 00-172-42 
The petitioner's request for reconsideration has been reviewed pursuant to 63-46b-l 3 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. 
DISPOSITION 
The petitioner's request for reconsideration is hereby DENIED. 
REASONS FOR THE DISPOSITION 
As explained in the recommended decision, UMAP will not cover treatment of a patient 
when the principal diagnosis is psychiatric or mental illness. It does not matter whether there 
were other diagnoses along with the principal diagnosis. Petitioner does not allege any new-
facts, but rather, reasserts what Petitioner already argued during the hearing, that the diagnosis 
and treatment for the emergency medical condition resulting from the suicide attempt should be 
distinguished from the principal psychiatric diagnosis and treatment Petitioner received while at 
the hospital. A final agency decision has been appropriately made on this issue. Reasserting it 
again is not grounds for granting a reconsideration. 
Petitioner also asserts as grounds for reconsideration, that UMAP violates constitutional 
equal protection principles because UMAP witness Cleve Evans stated that UMAP would cover 
emergency cardiac symptoms caused by a panic disorder, yet, will not cover the treatment of 
Petitioner's suicide attempt resulting from a bi-polar condition. This brief statement does not 
signify that UMAP has equal protection problems when read in the context of UMAP 
requirements. As discussed in the final agency order, UMAP requires that the principal diagnosis 
will determine whether or not UMAP covers hospital care. If a panic disorder precipitates 
cardiac symptoms and the principal diagnosis is a medical condition such as an underlying heart 
problem or cardiac arrest, it would be covered by UMAP. If a panic disorder creates cardiac 
symptoms that require some medical attention, such as medication to alleviate the symptoms, yet 
the principal diagnoses and treatment ends up being a psychiatric condition, the treatment would 
not be covered by UMAP. In the present case, the principal diagnosis of Petitioner's suicide 
attempt was her underlying problem with her bi-polar psychiatric condition. Although, the 
emergency room resolved the emergency medical condition resulting from Petitioner's bi-polar 
induced actions, the primary problem and focus was the Petitioner's psychiatric condition. Thus, 
during the Petitioner's 2 to 3 day stay in the hospital, the hospital chiefly addressed Petitioner's 
principal bi-polar psychiatric condition. The fact there are at times consequences to psychiatric 
, I y^ 
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conditions that require emergency care, does not override the principal diagnosis of the 
psychiatric condition. Petitioner's assertion of an equal protection issue based on a brief and 
general statement of a UMAP witness, does not create an equal protection issue. Especially, 
when Petitioner ignores UMAP's principal diagnoses requirements as explained in the final 
agency order. Accordingly, reconsideration is not warranted here. 
Finally, Petitioner commented on recent funding cuts to UMAP and seems to imply that 
budgetary constraints may have played a roll in the decision to deny Petitioner coverage for her 
hospital treatment. This case involved both the treatment of a medical condition and a 
psychiatric condition. The hospital records indicate that the principal diagnosis and treatment of 
Petitioner was for her psychiatric condition. Although, Petitioner presented herself to the 
hospital because of putting herself into a life threatening condition, the hospital quickly stabilized 
the emergency medical condition and then focused on what the hospital noted as the principal 
condition, the Petitioner's psychiatric problems. As determined in the final order, UMAP denied 
coverage based on the hospital records indicating a principal psychiatric condition. UMAP has 
always been a program that is very limited in its scope of coverage. Speculating and implying 
that UMAP inappropriately denied Petitioner coverage based on budgetary concerns does not 
warrant reconsideration of this matter. 
RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Judicial review may be secured by filing a petition in the Utah Court of Appeals within 
thirty days of the issuance of this Response to Request for Reconsideration. The petition shall be 
served upon the Director of Health Care Financing and shall state the specific grounds upon 
which review is sought. Failure to file such a petition within the 30-day time limit shall 
constitute a waiver of any right to appeal this Response to Request for Reconsideration. 
A copy of this Response to Request for Reconsideration shall be sent to the petitioner or 
his/her representative at the last known address by certified mail, return receipt requested. 
DATED this J^f&y of November, 2000. 
-Michael J. DeiW, Dire^or 
Division of Health Gare Financing 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
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26-18-10. Utah Medical Assistance Program — Policies 
and standards. 
(1) The division shall develop a medical assistance pro-
gram, which shall be known as the Utah Medical Assistance 
Program, for low income persons who are not eligible under 
the state plan for Medicaid under Title XIX of the Social 
Security Act or Medicare under Title XVIII of that act. 
(2) Persons in the custody of prisons, jails, halfway houses, 
and other nonmedical government institutions are not eligible 
for services provided under this section. 
(3) The department shah develop standards and administer 
policies relating to eligibility requirements, consistent with 
Subsection 26-18-3(6), for participation in the program, and 
for payment of medical claims for eligible persons. 
(4) The program shall be a payor of last resort. Before 
assistance is rendered the division shall investigate the avail-
ability of the resources of the spouse, father, mother, and adult 
child r en of the person making application. 
(5) The department shall determine what medically neces-
sary care or services are covered under the program, including 
(Juration of care, and methcd of payment, which may be 
partial or in full. 
(6) The department shall not provide public assistance for 
tnedical, hospital, or other medical expenditures or medical 
services to otherwise eligible persons where the purpose of the 
assistance is for the performance of an abortion, unless the life 
of the mother would be endangered if an abortion were not 
performed. 
(7) The department may establish rules to carry out the 
provisions of this section. 1999 
26-18-11. Rural hospitals. 
{V For purposes of this section "rural hospital" means a 
hospital located outside of a standard metropolitan statistical 
area, as designated by the United States Bureau of the 
| Census. 
(2) For purposes of the Medicaid program and the Utah 
Medical Assistance Program, the Division of Health Care 
Financing shall not discriminate among rural hospitals on the 
basis of size. 1988 
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R420-1-1. Introduction and Authority. 
(1) The Utah Medical Assistance Program (UMAP; 
is designed to provide medically necessary care to low 
income clients who are not eligible for Medicaid or 
Medicare. 
(2) This rule is authorized under Section 26-18-10. 
R420-1-2. Defini t ions. 
Terms used in this rule are defined in R414-1-1. 
except that "client'' shall have the meaning defined 
below. In addition: 
(1) "Chronic condition" means a condition character-
ized by its long duration or recurrence. 
(2) "Client" means a person who has completed a 
current form MI-13 and been approved for UMAP 
eligibility. 
(3) "Crime" means any felony, misdemeanor, or 
infraction, of which an individual is eventually con-
victed, pleads guilty or no contest, or enters into a 
diversion agreement as outlined in sections 77-2-5 
through -9. 
(4) ''Emergency service" means a medical service 
performed to treat a condition for which the absence of 
immediate medical attention could reasonably be ex-
pected to result in death or permanent disability to 
the client. Immediate medical attention is treatment 
given within 24 hours of the onset of symptoms or 
within 24 hours of diagnosis. 
(5) "Emergency transportation*' means an air ur 
ground ambulance required to transport a client in 
need of an emergency service. This does not include 
any transportation in which a client could have been 
safely transported by any other method of transpor-
tation. 
(6) "In custody" means being detained or held under 
guard by law enforcement personnel at the scene of a 
crime or in a detention facility, until unconditionally 
released, or released on probation or parole. The 
department shall consider a resident of a jail, correc-
tional facility, or half-way house to be in custody. 
(7) "Life threatening condition" means a medical 
condition which, if not immediately treated, poses an 
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imminent danger to life or will result in permanent 
disability. Disability is the limiting loss or absence of 
the capacity to perform activities of daily living or 
occupational demands. Permanent disability occurs 
when the degree of loss of this capacity becomes static 
or well-stabilized, and is not likely to improve despite 
continuing medical or rehabilitative measures. 
(8) "Medically indigent" is abbreviated "MF, which 
is a prefix for UMAP form numbers. 
(a) MI-13 is a UMAP form that explains to clients 
the rights and responsibilities they have as UMAP 
clients. A MI-13 form is current from the time it is 
completed until there is a break in eligibility of more 
than six consecutive months. 
(b) MI-706 is a UMAP form entitled "UMAP Reim-
bursement Agreement" that authorizes reimburse-
ment for a medical service. 
(9) "Medically necessary" means reasonably calcu-
lated to prevent, diagnose, or cure conditions that 
endanger life, cause suffering and pain, cause physi-
cal deformity or malfunction, or threaten to cause a 
handicap, and there is no other equally effective 
course of treatment available or suitable for the client 
requesting the service that is more conservative or 
less costly. 
(10) "Principal diagnosis at discharge" means the 
main medical problem, based on the best information 
available for review by UMAP. 
R420-1-3. Client Eligibility Requirements. 
(1) To be eligible for UMAP services, clients shall 
meet income and asset limits and other eligibility 
requirements found in the Medical Assistance 
Manual, Volume III F, which is incorporated by refer-
ence. Manuals can be viewed at the local Office of 
Family Support, or at the UMAP administrative office 
located at 288 N. 1460 W., Salt Lake City, Utah. 
(2) Eligibility for UMAP services is determined at 
an Office of Family Support district office. 
(3) Before a client can receive services from UMAP, 
he must have a specific medical need that is within 
the UMAP scope of services and meets all other 
UMAP criteria. 
R420-1-4. Program Access Requirements. 
(1) UMAP has three medical clinics. Each clinic has 
on its staff a physician, or a physician assistant or 
nurse practitioner working under the supervision of a 
physician. For clients who reside in Salt Lake, Weber, 
Morgan, and Utah counties, if the physician or super-
vising physician determines it appropriate, the physi-
cian, physician assistant, or nurse practitioner shall 
evaluate and treat the client. 
(2) The clinic shall refer the client outside of the 
clinic only for treatment of covered conditions that 
cannot be treated in the clinic. The supervising phy-
sician shall decide the conditions that can be treated 
at the clinic. The clinic manager shall decide the 
services that are covered under UMAP. 
(3) Clients residing in all other counties may contact 
the nearest Office of Family Support for a form MI-
706. This office may then refer the client to a private 
physician who is willing to treat the client within the 
guidelines of UMAP criteria. 
R420-1-5. Service Coverage. 
(1) The scope of services covered by UMAP is limited 
to treatment of conditions that meet one or more of the 
following criteria, unless elsewhere excluded: • 
(a) an acute condition characterized by a rapid onset 
requiring prompt medical attention. UMAP shall con-
sider a condition to be not acute'once it is medically 
established to have been in existence for four months < 
or more, regardless of when the client began experi-^1 
encing symptoms. Recurring conditions are not acute;'*! 
(b) a life-threatening condition that is not psychiat-* s t ] 
ric; ^ksrl 
(c) a communicable disease that poses a health risk 
to the general public; 
(d) a condition that will result in irreversible blind- „*& j 
ness if left untreated, blindness meaning no better,*^1 
than 20/200 visual acuity in the better eye after *~£-
correction. $ 
(e) cataracts, if the correction is no better than 20/60 „%* 
visual acuity in the better eye.
 t ? 
(f) eyeglasses for a client in a work or training £ 
program if the client cannot participate in the work or -f> 
training without the eyeglasses, or for a diabetic client *£ 
who cannot see well enough to administer his own 4 
medication. 
(2) UMAP may cover the following medical services: 
(a) outpatient hospital services; ; 
(b) physician services; 
(c) midwife and birthing center services; $ 
(d) radiology and lab services; } 
(e) emergency transportation services for both air % 
and ground; uj| 
(f) dental services; 2 
(g) pharmacy services; i 
(h) rural health services; 3 
(i) home health services for I.V. antibiotics. 
(3) For all UMAP covered services, the principal J 
diagnosis at discharge from the hospital is the reason <^  
for the care. UMAP may not consider the other diag- ^ 
noses when determining whether the service is cov- ^ 
ered by UMAP. jj 
(a) UMAP shall pay a minimal set triage fee for , 
emergency transportation, emergency room physi- 3 
cians, and emergency room facility charges for ser- j 
vices that do not result in an inpatient admission, if 'i 
the admission diagnosis is a UMAP covered medical ^ 
condition, but the principal diagnosis at discharge is j 
psychiatric. 
(b) The minimal set triage fee shall constitute 
payment for the entire service. A notation on the form 
MI-706 advises the provider that he received authori- 1 
zation for only the minimal set triage fee. j 
(4) A provider or a client may resolve questions 
about coverage of a specific condition or service by 
contacting the appropriate UMAP clinic in Salt Lake, 
Morgan, Weber, or Utah counties, or the Office of 
Family Support for all other counties, depending upon 
where the client lives. 
R420-1-6. Limitations and Excluded Services. 
(1) Conditions that are not covered by UMAP in-
clude: 
(a) chronic pain, back pain, knee pain, joint pain, 
from recurring or chronic conditions; 
(b) hernias that are not strangulated or incarcer-
ated, carpal tunnel syndrome, bunions, nasal polyps; 
(c) mental illness or disorder, drug addiction, alco-
hol addiction; 
(d) obesity, hormonal imbalance, bulimia, anorexia 
nervosa; -
(e) long-standing arthritis, except treatment of 
acute flare-ups is a covered service; 
(f) allergies, cataracts, temporomandibular joint 
dysfunction, premenstrual syndrome, aseptic (avascu-
lar) necrosis; -
(g)'rhinitis, 24-hour gastritis, common cold, any „ 
condition for which there is no accepted medical 
therapy; 
:*,* 
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« (h) a condition that is disabling, but does not meet 
I the mteria;iisted in"R420-l:5(l); -r:.. «^, > 
(i) a condition !that is not ^covered by the -Utah 
M^caid program;'''i-^ ;^  i i '&. «- ; .;- -l.w'-' 
/-' ' V ^ J ^ ^ S ^ ^ P ^ ^ ^ ^ . ^ 6 ^ 1 1 1 8 6 . 0 ^ a s n o w skiing or 
^;t^sno^^ ?a<n?;: Iw/i'/r- , V-.. -'• V1:. ^ 
^ U t ^ i ) a ^ ndition caused ytrhen the client was commit-
^ ^ n ^ O T m ^ ^ A J ^ s h a U aUow^elclient topresent 
• ' Hfoimatibnlo prove that involvement in the alleged 
. crime tdid moi Jt cause lor ^ contribute ?to :<his ^medical 
cbndltioif.^rhe^..clientJmust ^submit this information 
withlnT60 iiays^f ihe'date of the denial; . ; r-r;- *• — 
:4d)'iii 'Condition caused when the client was being 
arrested; ^ - ^ y ^ ^ • 
, (m) a condition caused when the chent was injured 
by a law enforcement officer; * 
*; - •• (n) a ^ condition 'caused -when ^ the chent >was in 
^ custody/ '/••', 
C"*
 T (2) Services that are not covered by UMAP include: 
?'--; (a) cosmetic surgery; 
*& • (b) tympanoplasties; „ 
jjk.v (c) hysterectomies and pelvic surgery, except when 
& there is a reasonable suspicion of a life threatening 
fcv * condition; „ ,
 c 
s (d) back surgeries, knee surgeries, joint surgeries, 
*
 H, for recurring or chronic conditions; 
M; • ^eX P s v c ^ ? t ^ P ^ ^ y fif^P?1L provided to a client 
ffev while he is in a psychiatric'fadlity^Wing, ward, or bed; 
y. (f) diagnostic work, unless a covered condition is 
suspected;- -
(g) speech pathology, audiology (except to rule out a 
brain tumor), audiometry (except to rule out a brain 
stem lesion); 
(h) medical supplies, except syringes, lancets, test 
strips for diabetics, and ostomy supplies; 
. (i) medical equipment, except an oxygen concentra-
tor if required 24 hours a day; 
(j) prosthetic devices, except once when the need for 
the device arises from any authorized surgery; 
(k) care in a long-term care facility, physical 
therapy, rehabilitative services, chiropractic services; 
(1) dental work (except for exam, x-ray, and extrac-
tion of infected teeth), dentures; 
(m) sterilization (tubal ligation, vasectomy, etc.), 
abortion (unless the life of the mother would be 
endangered if an abortion were not performed), birth 
control; 
(n) elective surgery, organ transplants; 
(0) liver biopsy or use of Interferon when being 
prescribed for treatment of Hepatitis C; 
(p) treatment in a pain clinic; 
(q) non-emergency use of an emergency room or 
emergency transportation; 
(r) a service that is not covered by the Utah Medic-
aid program; 
(s) a service if the department determines that 
there is or was an effective less-costly alternative; 
(t) a service provided to treat a medical condition, if 
the need for treatment arose while the client was in 
custody; 
(u) a service for a condition that is a complication of, 
or a follow-up service for, a non-covered UMAP ser-
vice. The only exception would be if the service was 
not covered as a result of lack of client eligibility. 
R420-1-7. Form MI-706^: C ^ J 
(1) UMAP may only pay for a service authorized on 
a form MI-706. Generally, the chent must obtain the 
form MI-706 before the service is provided. The chent 
may obtain the form .-MI-706 after^the 'service is 
' 'MP* 
£ 
provided if vthe service is -within /UMAP scope of 
services, meets all other UMAP criteria, and: •" 
(a) is for follow-up services for a surgery that UMAP 
has authorized.=Follow-up services .are ibr normal, 
uncomplicated post-surgery hospitalization, office fol-
low-ups;or other services provided within six weeks of 
the surgery.and directly areiateH t o ^ e surgery; ^or:^  
:.$^);fe fOTian sm&gen^iem . 
I ^ (c) is ibr Services^that were" pfjowdea hefore^UMAP .- .• 
approved thechentfor.eli^^ty/i^^.before the chent 
-had completed a'curreht form "MI-13.-The client jnust 
,:Tequest4£he form MI-706 nolater than one year after 
the date t)f service,1 or:_ihe"iatevUM^rapprwedliis' 
etigibility,1 whicheverplater. The. cUenlt shall provide 
. any documentation that UMAP requires, orthe chent 
wants considered, to make scope^df-seryice decisions. 
(2) A chent must present the form;MI:706 to the 
provider before receiving any service, except for situ-
ations in which there is no UMAP requirement for the 
chent to obtain the form MI-706 prior to receiving the 
service. If a chent presents a form MI-706 to a 
provider iefore .receiving a service, and the provider 
accepts the form MI-706, the provider may not hold 
the client financially liable for the service that was 
provided, whether or not UMAP reimburses the pro-
vider. If a chent does not present a form MI-706 to a 
provider, or if the provider does not accept the form 
MI-706, the, provider may hold the client financially 
liable for the service and treat the "chent as a "self-
pay" patient. Any time a provider receives a form 
MI-706, and bills UMAP using the MI-706 number, 
UMAP shall consider that the provider has accepted 
the form MI-706. 
(3) After a client has completed a current form 
MI-13 and is approved for UMAP eligibility, he must 
present a form MI-706 to the provider for all non-
emergency services before the services are provided. 
R420-1-8. Claims. 
(1) A provider shall submit a claim for UMAP 
services in the same way he submits a bill for Utah 
Medicaid services, except the provider must submit a 
form MI-706 number for UMAP services. If UMAP has 
authorized a service, a form MI-706 number will be 
printed on top of the form MI-706. The provider shall 
enter this number in the appropriate box on the 
invoice. The provider shall submit the claim no later 
than 12 months after the date of service or six months 
after the form MI-706 was issued, whichever is later. 
(2) If a provider timely submits a claim and the 
claim is denied because there is no form MI-706, the 
provider may resubmit the claim to UMAP no later 
than one year after the date of service or two months 
after the date of denial, whichever is later. The pro-
vider shall include with the resubmitted claim a copy 
of the remittance advice showing the denial, and 
documentation explaining the nature of the medical 
care provided. 
R420-1-9. Reimbursement. 
UMAP shall only reimburse Utah Medicaid provid-
ers who accept payment from UMAP as payment in 
full for the service provided. UMAP adopts the Utah 
Medicaid reimbursement policies and payment rates 
for services covered by UMAP. Because inpatient 
. hospital services are not a benefit of UMAP, UMAP 
shall not reimburse for these services. . . 
R420-1-10. Thircl Party Liability.
 : r 
(1) UMAP may not reimburse for covered medical 
services if payment for the service can be, or could 
; have been, obtained from other third-party sources. If 
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partial payment is made by a third-party payor, < 
UMAP shall pay the difference up to the limits set by 
Medicaid. ^ : » 
(2) Clients and providers shall disclose potentially ! 
liable third parties. When any other coverage is avail- ! 
able (such as treatment at the Veterans Administra- \ 
tion Hospital), the UMAP clinic or provider shall refer 
the client there for treatment, and UMAP may not 
authorize payment for those services. 
R420-1-11. Client Rights and Responsibilities. 
(1) The client shall make an appointment to see 
office or clinic staff. 
(2) If a client misses an appointment in a UMAP 
clinic, the client shall have either of two options 
regarding future appointments. The client can come 
in as a walk-in and wait to be seen on a first-come-
first-served basis after clients who have appoint-
ments, or the client can make a co-payment before 
being seen at his next appointment. The co-payment 
is $1 for missing one appointment, $2 for missing two 
consecutive appointments, and $3 for missing three 
consecutive appointments. If the client misses more 
than three consecutive appointments, the client must 
come in as a walk-in and wait to be seen on a 
first-come-first-served basis after clients who have 
appointments. Clients may cancel UMAP clinic ap-
 : 
pointments up to two hours before the appointment 
with no penalty. 
(3) If a client misses an appointment with a private 
provider, the client shall make a $5 co-payment to 
UMAP for each of the client's next two appointments 
with private providers before the client will be given a 
form MI-706 for these appointments. If the client 
keeps these appointments, UMAP will refund the $5 
as soon as the client returns to UMAP and UMAP 
verifies that the client kept the appointment. UMAP 
shall consider appointments with private providers to 
be missed if the client cancels the appointment less 
than 24 hours before the appointment. 
V, (4) UMAP may deny services to a client who ver-
bally or physically abuses a member of the UMAP 
s t a f f s ' . ; ' -.. -':• . . . . ' . ' . ' . ; ; • - . . • • •'••.. . 
; (5) UMAP shall send a Notice of Denial to a client 
who is denied coverage for a requested medical treat-
ment. If a client or a provider is aggrieved by any 
action or,; inaction of the department, the person 
aggrieved may request a hearing in accordance with 
R410-14. A provider does not have standing to contest 
issues'. concerning scope of services or the client's 
eligibility status. ' .. 
' V (6) The' client shall be responsible for making a 
timely request for a form MI-706. If he fails to obtain 
the form MI-706, the client shall be liable for any costs 
incurred." ^j'."\:y''j, .y}'-AV*V/;'.-.',:V' ~;,Y ; "•> "•".' 
•/• References: 26-1-5; 26-18-10. T- „ - . , 
:*:History: 9721,*~AMD, ~ 12/16/88; , 10420^ AMD, 
02/02/90; 10615, *NSC, T 03/29/90; ^ 16270,.: AMD, 
,: 11/17/94; T17263, ? EMR^ 09/18/95^: 17264, AMD, 
i- 11/28/95^9715; 5 Y R , 0 7 / 2 1 / 9 7 ^ 1 ^ ^ i ; ^ ^ 
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